The enactivist account of consciousness posits that motivated activation of sensorimotor action imagery (through efferent activity) anticipates possible action affordances of environmental situations, resulting in representation of the environment with a conscious "feel" associated with the valences motivating the anticipations. This approach makes the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation easier to resolve, and offers promise for understanding how consciousness results from natural processes. Given a process-oriented understanding of the way many systems in non-conscious nature are "proto-motivated" toward realizing unactualized possibilities, and can use symbolic objects to "proto-represent" unactualized possibilities, it becomes more clear how self-organizing systems can subserve Subjective consciousness. If a system executes, in a unified way, both a proto-desire and a proto-representation of the same unactualized possibility - in order to provide a kind of causal power for the unactualized possibility - then the result is the familiar experience of phenomenal consciousness.
机构:
Univ Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5B8, Canada
Australian Natl Univ, Canberra, ACT 2601, AustraliaUniv Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5B8, Canada