From being to the soul, and back. Brentano, Aristotle and the project of a scientific philosophy

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the project of a scientific philosophy drives Franz Brentano's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Called upon to grant on empirical basis the ultimate foundation for the universe of being, this new form of psychology would thus retrieve a certain legacy from ancient metaphysics. And Brentano, for his part, would hold the sources of Greek, especially Aristotelian, and modern thought together in a single, systematic vision. But can we really consider Brentano as an Aristotelian, in the light of his psychology project? The question is well known and apparently, as Franco Volpi argues, the epistemological scope of Brentanian psychology would no longer find in Aristotle its true guiding inspiration. Another reading is yet possible, considering that at no time Brentano's intention is to make psychology a way back to Aristotle. It is our research hypothesis that leads us to ponder with great attention the 1867 treatise, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles: the recourse to Aristotle would then remain necessary in order to understand the project of a new psychology which does not ultimately forget its metaphysical vocation.