Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets

被引：0
|
作者：
Matros, Alexander [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Dept Econ, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 115卷 / 03期
关键词：
Asymmetric information; Adverse selection; Winner's curse; Takeover game;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a "good" project even if the insider has informational advantage. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：500 / 503
页数：4
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