Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

被引：43
|
作者：
Heifetz, Aviad [1 ]
Meier, Martin [2 ]
Schipper, Burkhard C. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Open Univ Israel, Econ & Management Dept, Raanana, Israel
[2] Inst Hohere Studien, Vienna, Austria
[3] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 81卷
关键词：
Unawareness; Extensive-form games; Extensive-form rationalizability; EXTENSIVE GAMES; EQUILIBRIA; INDUCTION; PERFECTION; PLAYERS; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：50 / 68
页数：19
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