Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?

被引：31
|
作者：
Sönmez, T [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Koc Univ, Coll Econ & Adm Sci, TR-80860 Istanbul, Turkey
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1999年 / 86卷 / 01期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2507
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码：148 / 156
页数：9
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