Wage Subsidies and Fair Wages

被引:2
|
作者
Blumkin, Tomer [1 ]
Pinhas, Haim [1 ]
Zultan, Ro'i [1 ]
机构
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
Wage subsidies; Welfare; Gift exchange; Tax incidence; Laboratory experiment; GIFT-EXCHANGE; REAL-EFFORT; TAX; TRUST; FIELD; RECIPROCITY; INCOME; EQUIVALENCE; TAXATION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103497
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Wage subsidies can be provided directly to the worker, or indirectly by subsidizing the employer; with reduced cost of labor, employers offer higher wages. The standard literature stipulates that this statutory incidence bears no implications for the economic incidence. We propose and test a mechanism by which indirect subsidies lead to higher social welfare. Studies show that workers reciprocate higher wages with higher effort. Indirect subsidies are shifted to the workers as higher wages, leading workers to reciprocate with higher effort and productivity. A controlled laboratory experiment supports our behavioral hypotheses and confirms the behavioral and welfare implications. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条