The determinants of federal and state enforcement of workplace safety regulations: OSHA inspections 1990-2010

被引:10
|
作者
Jung, Juergen [1 ]
Makowsky, Michael D. [2 ]
机构
[1] Towson Univ, Dept Econ, Towson, MD 21250 USA
[2] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Emergency Med, Ctr Adv Modeling Social Behav & Hlth Sci, Baltimore, MD USA
关键词
Regulation; Enforcement; Occupational safety; Decentralization; POLITICAL CONTROL; SAMPLE SELECTION; LAW-ENFORCEMENT; HEALTH;
D O I
10.1007/s11149-013-9229-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the largest negotiated reductions in fines.
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页码:1 / 33
页数:33
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