Multi-item auctions for automatic negotiation

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem, which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions, which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities that let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the 'richer' an agent is. the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.