Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains

被引：117
|
作者：
Alexandridis, George [1 ]
Fuller, Kathleen P. [2 ]
Terhaar, Lars [1 ]
Traylos, Nickolaos G.
机构：
[1] Univ Reading, Henley Business Sch, ICMA Ctr, Reading RG6 2AH, Berks, England
[2] Univ Mississippi, Sch Business, University, MS 38677 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2013年 / 20卷
关键词：
Public acquisitions; Target size; Premium; Acquirer returns; M-AND-AS; CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS; CEO OVERCONFIDENCE; ACQUIRING FIRMS; TAKEOVER BIDS; STOCK RETURNS; MERGER WAVE; WEALTH; TARGET; PAYMENT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.006
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This study examines the contradictory predictions regarding the association between the premium paid in acquisitions and deal size. We document a robust negative relation between offer premia and target size, indicating that acquirers tend to pay less for large firms, not more. We also find that the overpayment potential is lower in acquisitions of large targets. Yet, they still destroy more value for acquirers around deal announcements, implying that target size may proxy, among others, for the unobserved complexity inherent in large deals. We provide evidence in favor of this interpretation. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：1 / 13
页数：13
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