Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion

被引：26
|
作者：
Mathis, Jerome [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Toulouse, Toulouse Sch Econ GREMAQ, F-31000 Toulouse, France
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 143卷 / 01期
关键词：
Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable types;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：571 / 584
页数：14
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