Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria with unobservable output, uncoordinated consumers and large number of firms

被引：1
|
作者：
Chowdhury, PR [1 ]
机构：
[1] Jawaharlal Nehru Univ, ITDD, CSDILE, New Delhi 110067, India
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 63卷 / 02期
关键词：
pure strategy Bertrand equilibria; coordination failure;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00040-3
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of price competition where the output levels of the firms are unobservable and consumers are uncoordinated. We show that if the number of firms is large enough then any price, greater than the competitive one, can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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页码：207 / 211
页数：5
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