'Unlucky' Gettier Cases

被引：3

作者：

Stone, Jim ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ New Orleans, Dept Philosophy, New Orleans, LA 70148 USA

来源：

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2013年 / 94卷 / 03期

关键词：

KNOWLEDGE;

D O I：

10.1111/papq.12006

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two 'unlucky' Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad 'anti-luck' codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?

引用

页码：421 / 430

页数：10

共 50 条

[1] Are Gettier cases disturbing?
Hawke, Peter
Schoonen, Tom
[J]. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2021, 178 (05) : 1503 - 1527
[2] Are Gettier cases disturbing?
Peter Hawke
Tom Schoonen
[J]. Philosophical Studies, 2021, 178 : 1503 - 1527
[3] LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES
Besson, Corine
[J]. PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 2009, 59 (234): : 1 - 19
[4] Knowledge and assertion in "Gettier" cases
Turri, John
[J]. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2016, 29 (05) : 759 - 775
[5] A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic
Williamson, Timothy
[J]. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2015, 172 (01) : 129 - 140
[6] A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic
Timothy Williamson
[J]. Philosophical Studies, 2015, 172 : 129 - 140
[7] STANDARD GETTIER CASES: A PROBLEM FOR GRECO?
Ryan, Shane
[J]. GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN, 2014, 90 (01) : 201 - 212
[8] Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic
Cohen, Stewart
Comesana, Juan
[J]. INQUIRY-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2013, 56 (01): : 15 - 29
[9] ON THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIER CASES FOR MODAL KNOWLEDGE
Dragomir, Alexandru
[J]. REVUE ROUMAINE DE PHILOSOPHIE, 2022, 66 (02): : 315 - 326
[10] Gettier Cases without False Lemmas?
Michael Levin
[J]. Erkenntnis, 2006, 64 : 381 - 392

← 1 2 3 4 5 →