Accounting Comparability, Conservatism, Executive Compensation-Performance, and Information Quality

被引:13
|
作者
Daryaei, Abbas Ali [1 ]
Fattahi, Yasin [1 ]
Askarany, Davood [2 ]
Askary, Saeed [3 ]
Mollazamani, Mahdad [4 ]
机构
[1] Imam Khomeini Int Univ, Fac Social Sci, Accounting, Qazvin 3414896818, Iran
[2] Univ Auckland, Sch Business, Accounting & Finance, Auckland 92019, New Zealand
[3] Gulf Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Accounting & MIS, Kuwait 32093, Kuwait
[4] Univ Manitoba, Asper Sch Business, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada
关键词
accounting comparability; executive compensation-performance; earnings management; conservatism; accounting information quality; public interests; FINANCIAL STATEMENT COMPARABILITY; IFRS ADOPTION IMPROVE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; REAL; FIRMS;
D O I
10.3390/jrfm15110489
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the relationship between accounting comparability, executive compensation, conditional and unconditional conservatism, and accounting information quality. The findings suggest that conditional conservatism and accounting comparability have a positive and significant impact on executive compensation. Moreover, accrual earnings management can strengthen the relationship between accounting comparability and executive compensation, whereas this is not the case with actual earnings management. Unconditional conservatism, however, does not significantly influence executive compensation. In the end, determining the correlation between earnings management and conservatism reveals that executives use conditional conservatism to perform opportunistic behaviours and gain more compensation. In light of the current results, it is expected that the assimilation of standardisation processes and their use in conjunction with existing features will enhance information quality, greater reliability of financial reports, and protect public interests.
引用
收藏
页数:28
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