Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness

被引：14
|
作者：
Cato, Susumu [1 ]
机构：
[1] Tokyo Metropolitan Univ, Grad Sch Social Sci, Hachioji, Tokyo 1920397, Japan
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 2013年 / 75卷 / 04期
关键词：
Arrow's impossibility theorem; Strong Pareto; Ultrafilter; Conditional decisiveness; Serial dictatorship; COLLECTIVE CHOICE; INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE; THEOREM; PREFERENCES; DECISIONS; RULES; SETS;
D O I：
10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.
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页码：563 / 579
页数：17
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