STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE MEANING OF MEANING

[Statutory interpretation has replaced the analysis of judicial reasons about the common law as the most important task ordinarily performed by Australian lawyers. This was inevitable as the amount of law made by, or under, legislation increased and the room for the residual common law narrowed. The development has, or should have, important consequences for legal education and professional training. The basic principles governing statutory interpretation are repeatedly stated, without apparent disagreement, in decisions of the High Court of Australia. According to the author, they involve deriving meaning from close consideration of the text, context and purpose (policy) of any contested provisions. But the process is an art and not a science, as illustrated by reference to the divided decision of the High Court in Carr v Western Australia. The author accepts Professor James Raymond's challenge that judges should 'dig deeper' in explaining their real reasons for preferring one available interpretation over another. Without venturing into 'pop psychology', the author considers that deep-lying legal values can often be revealed and that any reversion to the former error of textual literalism needs to be resisted.]