机构:
Univ St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, FranceUniv St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, France
Billand, Pascal
[1
]
Bravard, Christophe
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, FranceUniv St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, France
Bravard, Christophe
[1
]
Sarangi, Sudipta
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Louisiana State Univ, DIW Berlin, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
Louisiana State Univ, Dept Econ, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USAUniv St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, France
Sarangi, Sudipta
[2
,3
]
机构:
[1] Univ St Etienne, CREUSET, St Etienne, France
[2] Louisiana State Univ, DIW Berlin, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
[3] Louisiana State Univ, Dept Econ, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links plays a crucial role for the existence of Nash networks. The paper also provides conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous.