Strategic oil stockpiling for energy security: The case of China and India

被引:15
|
作者
Zhang, Xiao-Bing [1 ]
Qin, Ping [1 ]
Chen, Xiaolan [2 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[2] Sichuan Univ, Sch Econ, Chengdu 610065, Peoples R China
关键词
Strategic petroleum reserve; Dynamic game; Energy security; Developing countries; DYNAMIC-PROGRAMMING MODEL; PETROLEUM RESERVE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; POLICIES; GAME; PRICES;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2016.11.021
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Compared with the developed countries, the developing countries could be more vulnerable to oil supply disruptions due to their lack of strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs). Several developing countries, including China and India, are establishing their SPRs to ensure energy security. In the common world oil market, one country's SPR decisions can be affected by the decisions of other countries. This paper investigates the SPR policies of China and India, two of the largest developing countries, in a game-theoretic framework, where the interactions between the two countries are taken into account. The results show that players equilibrium stockpiling strategies and total expected costs could vary significantly with the initial oil market state, stockpile acquisition capacity and the probabilities for disruptions to persist. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:253 / 260
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条