Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games

被引：11
|
作者：
Hingu, Dharini [1 ]
Rao, K. S. Mallikarjuna [2 ]
Shaiju, A. J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Indian Inst Technol Madras, Dept Math, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India
[2] Indian Inst Technol, Sch Ind Engn & Operat Res, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
来源：
DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS | 2018年 / 8卷 / 01期
关键词：
Evolutionary games; Continuous action spaces; ESS; Replicator dynamics; Stability; DYNAMICS;
D O I：
10.1007/s13235-016-0207-1
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
Asymptotic stability of equilibrium in evolutionary games with continuous action spaces is an important question. Existing results in the literature require that the equilibrium state be monomorphic. In this article, we address this question when the equilibrium is polymorphic. We show that any uninvadable and finitely supported state is asymptotically stable equilibrium of replicator equation.
引用
收藏
页码：141 / 156
页数：16
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