Dynamic Congestion and Tolls with Mobile Source Emission

被引:17
|
作者
Friesz, Terry L. [1 ]
Han, Ke [2 ]
Liu, Hongcheng [1 ]
Yao, Tao [1 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Ind & Mfg Engn, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] Penn State Univ, Dept Math, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Congestion toll; dynamic user equilibrium; mobile source emission; dynamic Stackelberg game; CELL TRANSMISSION MODEL; ALGORITHM; OPTIMIZATION; CONSISTENT; VEHICLE; WAVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.05.044
中图分类号
U [交通运输];
学科分类号
08 ; 0823 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as mathematical programming with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty-based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:818 / 836
页数:19
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