Congestion toll;
dynamic user equilibrium;
mobile source emission;
dynamic Stackelberg game;
CELL TRANSMISSION MODEL;
ALGORITHM;
OPTIMIZATION;
CONSISTENT;
VEHICLE;
WAVES;
D O I:
10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.05.044
中图分类号:
U [交通运输];
学科分类号:
08 ;
0823 ;
摘要:
This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as mathematical programming with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty-based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.