On Scepticism and Philosophy in David Hume

被引:0
|
作者
Janousek, Hynek [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Filosof Ustav Akad CR, Vvi, Prague, Czech Republic
[2] Univ Hradec Kralove, Filozof Fak, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic
来源
FILOSOFICKY CASOPIS | 2020年 / 68卷 / 04期
关键词
David Hume; Pyrrhonism; scepticism; theory of knowledge;
D O I
10.46854/fc.2020.4r.623
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
The study examines Zuzana Parusnikova's book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume's philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume's concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume's view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova's interpretation of abstruse philosophy.
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页码:623 / 633
页数:11
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