Climate Change and National Self-Interest

Mitigation of climate change is often described as a tragedy of the commons. According to this theoretical framework, it is collectively rational for present-generation countries to mitigate climate change, but not individually rational to do so. It is rather in national self-interest to 'free-ride' on the mitigation actions of other countries. In this paper, I discuss two arguments criticizing this view. According to these arguments, it is in most cases individually rational for present-generation countries to mitigate, i.e., it is in their national self-interest. The first argument focuses on national self-interest in terms of economic efficiency, the second on national self-interest in terms of national security. I conclude that the critical arguments to a large extent are tenable, but that they seem to underestimate the significance of those cases in which it is not in national self-interest to mitigate climate change. In these cases the tragedy of the commons framework is still applicable.