Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts?

被引:88
|
作者
Tobia, Kevin [1 ]
Buckwalter, Wesley [2 ]
Stich, Stephen [1 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA
[2] CUNY, Dept Philosophy, Grad Ctr, New York, NY USA
关键词
Actor-Observer Bias; Expertise Defense; Intuition; ACTOR-OBSERVER BIAS;
D O I
10.1080/09515089.2012.696327
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers' moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
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页码:629 / 638
页数:10
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