A moneymaking scan: Dual reimbursement systems and supplier-induced demand for diagnostic imaging

被引:10
|
作者
Zabrodina, Vera [1 ,2 ]
Dusheiko, Mark [2 ]
Moschetti, Karine [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Basel, Fac Business & Econ, Peter Merian Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland
[2] Univ Lausanne, Ctr Primary Care & Publ Hlth Unisante, Lausanne, Switzerland
关键词
diagnostic imaging; financial incentives; reimbursement systems; supplier-induced demand; PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; HEALTH-CARE COST; COMPUTED-TOMOGRAPHY; HOSPITALS RESPOND; COMPETITION; QUALITY; GROWTH; DOCTOR;
D O I
10.1002/hec.4152
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In complex health systems with growing healthcare spending, combining reimbursement systems that incentivize cost-efficient healthcare provision within and across care sectors is key. This study investigates whether dual reimbursement systems lead hospitals to offset financial pressures in one care sector by inducing demand in another. We find that hospital imaging units induced demand for costly and unnecessaryambulatoryimaging examinations reimbursed under fee-for-service, following a reform that introduced prospective payment and increased competition in theinpatientsector in Switzerland in 2012. Market structure, competitive pressures, and price regulations also influence demand inducement by varying the response to the reform. Reimbursement systems can influence supplier-induced demand in other care sectors within hospitals where revenue is tied to the intensity of care provision. In particular, the possibility to self-refer patients to high-margin diagnostic examinations bears negative consequences on healthcare expenditures and potentially patient health.
引用
收藏
页码:1566 / 1585
页数:20
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