Review of active defense methods against power CPS false data injection attacks from the multiple spatiotemporal perspective

被引:7
|
作者
Bo, Xiaoyong [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Qu, Zhaoyang [1 ,3 ]
Liu, Yaowei [4 ]
Dong, Yunchang [1 ,2 ]
Zhang, Zhenming [1 ,2 ]
Cui, Mingshi [5 ]
机构
[1] Northeast Elect Power Univ, Sch Elect Engn, Jilin 132012, Jilin, Peoples R China
[2] Jilin Agr Sci & Technol Univ, Elect & Informat Engn Coll, Jilin 132101, Jilin, Peoples R China
[3] Jilin Prov Engn Technol Res Ctr Power Big Data In, Jilin 132012, Jilin, Peoples R China
[4] State Grid Jilin Elect Power Co Ltd, Changchun 130012, Peoples R China
[5] State Grid East Inner Mongolia Elect Power Co Ltd, Informat & Commun Co, Hohhot 010011, Peoples R China
关键词
Power cyber-physical system; False data injection attacks; Active defense; Multiple spatiotemporal coordination; Data-driven; CASCADING FAILURES; SYSTEMS; MODEL; OPTIMIZATION; DISPATCH; ENCRYPTION; STRATEGIES; EFFICIENT; INTERNET; DRIVEN;
D O I
10.1016/j.egyr.2022.08.236
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
The power cyber-physical system (CPS) realizes the wide-area interconnection of new energy sources and multiple loads and the dynamic interaction of information and energy flows; however it faces increasingly severe security threats of false data injection attacks (FDIAs). In this context, the active defense methods against power CPS FDIAs from the multiple spatiotemporal perspective are summarized and analyzed in this paper. First, the architecture of a power CPS is abstracted and its multiple spatiotemporal coordination characteristic and FDIAs security risk are expounded upon. Then, the active defense system against FDIAs is conceived in the spatiotemporal coordinate system, and based on different spatiotemporal intersections, the six active defense methods and application examples - namely network deception, data encryption protection, vulnerability policy protection, false identification correction, traffic anomaly detection, and fault prevention control - are summarized. Finally, the limitations of existing active defense methods against FDIAs are discussed, and the linked defense methods with multiple spatiotemporal coordination are prospected. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:11235 / 11248
页数:14
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