机构:
Univ St Etienne, CNRS UMR GATE Lyon St Etienne 5824, St Etienne, France
IXXI, St Etienne, FranceUniv Franche Comte, CRESE, F-25009 Besancon, France
Remila, Eric
[2
,3
]
Solal, Philippe
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ St Etienne, CNRS UMR GATE Lyon St Etienne 5824, St Etienne, FranceUniv Franche Comte, CRESE, F-25009 Besancon, France
Solal, Philippe
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Franche Comte, CRESE, F-25009 Besancon, France
[2] Univ St Etienne, CNRS UMR GATE Lyon St Etienne 5824, St Etienne, France
We introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with a fixed but arbitrary player set. These axioms require either invariance of an allocation rule or invariance of the payoff assigned by an allocation rule to a specified player in two related TU-games. Combinations of these new axioms are used to characterize the Shapley value, the Equal Division rule, and the Equal Surplus Division rule. The classical axioms of Efficiency, Anonymity, Equal treatment of equals, Additivity and Linearity are not used.