Epistemic and Instrumental Rationality

被引:0
|
作者
Hanzek, Ljudevit [1 ]
机构
[1] Sveuciliste Splitu, Filozofski Fak, HR-21000 Split, Croatia
来源
FILOZOFSKA ISTRAZIVANJA | 2012年 / 32卷 / 3-4期
关键词
epistemic rationality; instrumental rationality; incommensurability thesis; categorical normativity; hypothetical normativity;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Epistemic rationality is the rationality of belief, while instrumental rationality is the rationality of action. If it is possible for a belief to be instrumentally rational (or irrational), the conflict between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality also seems possible. Incommensurability thesis claims that the described conflict is unsolvable because epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality cannot be meaningfully compared. However, if the reduction of one of these types of rationality to the other can be achieved, the conflict could be resolved (in principle). While the reduction of epistemic rationality to instrumental rationality can seem promising, categorical normativity which characterizes epistemic rationality remains a significant problem.
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页码:411 / 425
页数:15
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