Takeover defenses, golden parachutes, and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optimal contracting

被引：1

作者：

Chakraborty, Atreya ^{[2
]}

Farah, Abdikarim ^{[3
]}

Barkoulas, John ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Georgia So Univ, Dept Finance & Quantitat Anal, Statesboro, GA 30460 USA

[2] Univ Massachusetts, Accounting & Finance Dept, Coll Management, Boston, MA 02125 USA

[3] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2008年 / 14卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

golden parachutes; antitakeover defenses; tender offers; mergers and acquisitions;

D O I：

10.1080/13518470802041684

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris' (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 2 1, no. 4 : 614-25) bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters. We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options.

引用

页码：273 / 280

页数：8