Rejection of Unfair Offers Can Be Driven by Negative Emotions, Evidence from Modified Ultimatum Games with Anonymity

被引:10
|
作者
Ma, Ning [1 ]
Li, Nan
He, Xiao-Song
Sun, De-Lin
Zhang, Xiaochu
Zhang, Da-Ren
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, CAS Key Lab Brain Funct & Dis, Hefei 230026, Anhui, Peoples R China
来源
PLOS ONE | 2012年 / 7卷 / 06期
关键词
SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING; NEURAL BASIS; COOPERATION; PUNISHMENT; NEUROSCIENCE; FAIRNESS; BEHAVIOR; TRUST; PREFERENCES; COGNITION;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0039619
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
The rejection of unfair offers can be affected by both negative emotions (e. g. anger and moral disgust) and deliberate cognitive processing of behavioral consequences (e. g. concerns of maintaining social fairness and protecting personal reputation). However, whether negative emotions are sufficient to motivate this behavior is still controversial. With modified ultimatum games, a recent study (Yamagishi T, et al. (2009) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:11520-11523) found that people reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases inequity, and even when they could not communicate to the proposers. Yamagishi suggested that rejection of unfair offers could occurr without people's concerning of maintaining social fairness, and could be driven by negative emotions. However, as anonymity was not sufficiently guaranteed in Yamagishi's study, the rejection rates in their experiments may have been influenced by people's concerns of protecting personal reputation (reputational concerns) in addition to negative emotions; thus, it was unclear whether the rejection was driven by negative emotions, or by reputational concerns, or both. In the present study, with specific methods to ensure anonymity, the effect of reputational concerns was successfully ruled out. We found that in a private situation in which rejection could not be driven by reputational concerns, the rejection rates of unfair offers were significantly larger than zero, and in public situations in which rejection rates could be influenced by both negative emotions and reputational concerns, rejection rates were significantly higher than that in the private situation. These results, together with Yamagishi's findings, provided more complete evidence suggesting (a) that the rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions and (b) that deliberate cognitive processing of the consequences of the behavior can increase the rejection rate, which may benefit social cooperation.
引用
收藏
页数:6
相关论文
共 5 条
  • [1] Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity
    Yamagishi, Toshio
    Horita, Yutaka
    Mifune, Nobuhiro
    Hashimoto, Hirofumi
    Li, Yang
    Shinada, Mizuho
    Miura, Arisa
    Inukai, Keigo
    Takagishi, Haruto
    Simunovic, Dora
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2012, 109 (50) : 20364 - 20368
  • [2] Inequity enhancing rejection of unfair offers: Comparison of the ultimatum, impunity, and private impunity games
    Horita, Yutaka
    Yamagishi, Toshio
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2008, 43 (3-4) : 142 - 142
  • [3] Fear of Negative Evaluation Moderates the Effect of Subliminal Fear Priming on Rejection of Unfair Offers in the Ultimatum Game
    Haruto Takagishi
    Takayuki Fujii
    Kuniyuki Nishina
    Hiroyuki Okada
    [J]. Scientific Reports, 6
  • [4] Fear of Negative Evaluation Moderates the Effect of Subliminal Fear Priming on Rejection of Unfair Offers in the Ultimatum Game
    Takagishi, Haruto
    Fujii, Takayuki
    Nishina, Kuniyuki
    Okada, Hiroyuki
    [J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 2016, 6
  • [5] Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers
    John A. List
    Todd L. Cherry
    [J]. Experimental Economics, 2000, 3 (1) : 11 - 29