Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?

被引：10

作者：

Garber, Steven ^{[1
]}

Greenberg, Michael D. ^{[1
]}

Rhodes, Hilary

Zhuo, Xiaohui ^{[2
]}

Adams, John L. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] RAND Corp, Santa Monica, CA 90406 USA

[2] Pardee RAND Grad Sch, Santa Monica, CA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES | 2009年 / 6卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01156.x

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

We analyze effects of noneconomic damages caps and attorney fee limits (AFLs) on the ability of people injured by negligent physicians to retain qualified lawyers to represent them. We employ survey data from 965 plaintiffs' attorneys who reported likelihoods of accepting hypothetical meritorious cases described by scenarios. We estimate how willingness to accept such cases increases with the expected hourly fees associated with them, and the estimates suggest substantial effects and plausible tradeoffs. We conclude that caps and AFLs make it harder to retain counsel in various circumstances, and we present policy simulations elucidating how several factors combine to determine these effects.

引用

页码：637 / 686

页数：50