Evidence of Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs

被引:35
|
作者
Bastani, Hamsa [1 ,2 ]
Goh, Joel [3 ,4 ]
Bayati, Mohsen [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] IBM Thomas J Watson Res Ctr, Yorktown Hts, NY 10598 USA
[3] Natl Univ Singapore, NUS Business Sch, Singapore 119245, Singapore
[4] Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[5] Stanford Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Medicare; pay-for-performance; upcoding; asymmetric information; quality control; detection; BLOOD-STREAM INFECTIONS; URINARY-TRACT-INFECTION; MEDICARE; REIMBURSEMENT; NONPAYMENT; OPERATIONS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2017.2996
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Recent Medicare legislation seeks to improve patient care quality by financially penalizing providers for hospital-acquired infections (HAIs). However, Medicare cannot directly monitor HAI rates and instead relies on providers accurately self-reporting HAIs in claims to correctly assess penalties. Consequently, the incentives for providers to improve service quality may disappear if providers upcode, i.e., misreport HAIs (possibly unintentionally) in a manner that increases reimbursement or avoids financial penalties. Identifying upcoding in claims data is challenging because of unobservable confounders (e.g., patient risk). We leverage state-level variations in adverse event reporting regulations and instrumental variables to discover contradictions in HAI and present-on-admission (POA) infection reporting rates that are strongly suggestive of upcoding. We conservatively estimate that 10,000 out of 60,000 annual reimbursed claims for POA infections (18.5%) were upcoded HAIs, costing Medicare $200 million. Our findings suggest that self-reported quality metrics are unreliable and, thus, that recent legislation may result in unintended consequences.
引用
收藏
页码:1042 / 1060
页数:19
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