Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C plus plus Binaries

Modern operating systems are equipped with defenses that render legacy code injection attacks inoperable. However. attackers can bypass these defenses by crafting attacks that reuse existing code in a program's memory. One of the most common classes of attacks manipulates inemory data used indirectly to execute code, such as function pointers. This is especially prevalent in C++ programs, since tables of function pointers (vtables) are used by all major compilers to support polymorphism. In this paper. we propose VCI, binary rewriting system that secures C++ binaries against vtable attacks. VCI works directly on stripped binary files. It identifies and reconstructs various C semantics from the binary, and constructs a strict C++ policy by resolving and pairing virtual function calls (vcalls) with precise sets of target classes. The policy is enforced by instrumenting checks into the binary at wall sites. Experimental results on SPEC CPU2006 and Firefox show that VCI is significantly more precise than state-of-the-art binary solutions. Testing against the ground truth from the source-based defense GCC VTV, VCI achieved greater than 69% precision in most cases, accounting for at least 48% to 99% additional reduction in the attack surface compared to the state-of-the-art binary defenses. VCI incurs a 7.79% average runtime overhead which is comparable to the state-of-the-art. In addition, we discuss how VCI defends against real-world attacks; and how it impacts advanced vtable reuse attacks such as COOP.