This essay critically examines a conception of morality which has at its centre the deontic evaluation of actions. This is often expressed in the claim that the Right is prior to the Good. Against such a view, it is argued here that the (morally) Good is prior to the (morally) Right: Grasping the concept of the Good is a condition of understanding what morality is. This leads to the claim that the evaluative dimension is more fundamental than the deontic dimension and that, strictly speaking, evaluative judgments are the only kind of moral judgments. Rightly understood, notions like >morally right< or >morally obligated< do not serve to express deontic evaluations but have their proper place in descriptive judgments, in which actions are placed in relation to the Good. An action is morally right if and insofar as it is rightly described as realizing the Good. In contrast to this view, a deontic interpretation of these notions has the consequence of elevating morality to a proper source of commands, a secular analogue of a divine legislator. >Morally obligated< takes on the meaning of >obligated by morality< or >obligated by the moral law< (Sittengesetz). Modern ethical thought and discussions about >moral issues< in our society are both dominated by such an understanding of morality as a system of moral norms. The final part of the essay argues that both the deontic and the evaluative conceptions of morality can be traced back to Judeo-Christian sources.
