An UAV-based incentive mechanism for Crowdsensing with budget constraints

被引:0
|
作者
Jaimes, Luis G. [1 ]
Calderon, Juan M. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Florida Polytech Univ, Lakeland, FL 33805 USA
[2] Bethun Cookman Univ, Daytona Beach, FL USA
[3] Univ Santo Tomas, Bogota, Colombia
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Crowdsensing; UAV; Coverage; Drones; NETWORKS; SYSTEMS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Monitoring environmental variables in lower layers of the atmosphere is an important activity to measure changes that result from natural events, and human interventions. Volcano eruptions, commercial aviation, and the massive spread of pesticides using light aircraft are just some examples of low layer atmosphere polluters. Twice a day, every day of the year, weather balloons are released simultaneously from almost 900 locations worldwide to monitor environmental variables. The flight of these synthetic rubber balloons last for around 2 hours, then they become pollution too. Recent advances in small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with built in sensors, and their emerging role in business supply chain make UAVs ideal participants for environmental monitoring. In this paper, we present an incentive mechanism for UAV-Crowdsensing. The core of the proposed mechanism consists of a recurrent reverse action and a recruitment model. By these two components, the system encourages UAVs sensing from locations that maximize volume coverage within a given budget. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of the proposed incentive mechanism.
引用
收藏
页数:6
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsensing with Budget Constrains
    Wang, Xin
    Goss, Quentin
    Akbas, Mustafa Ilhan
    Chakeri, Alireza
    Calderon, Juan M.
    Jaimes, Luis G.
    [J]. IEEE SOUTHEASTCON 2020, 2020,
  • [2] An incentive mechanism based on a Stackelberg game for mobile crowdsensing systems with budget constraint
    Sedghani, Hamta
    Ardagna, Danilo
    Passacantando, Mauro
    Lighvan, Mina Zolfy
    Aghdasi, Hadi S.
    [J]. AD HOC NETWORKS, 2021, 123 (123)
  • [3] A Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Weighted Coverage Maximization in Mobile Crowdsensing
    Zheng, Zhenzhe
    Wu, Fan
    Gao, Xiaofeng
    Zhu, Hongzi
    Tang, Shaojie
    Chen, Guihai
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, 2017, 16 (09) : 2392 - 2407
  • [4] Freshness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing With Budget Constraint
    Cheng, Ying
    Wang, Xiumin
    Zhou, Pan
    Zhang, Xinglin
    Wu, Weiwei
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, 2023, 16 (06) : 4248 - 4260
  • [5] A Behavior-Based Incentive Mechanism for Crowd Sensing with Budget Constraints
    Sun, Jiajun
    Ma, Huadong
    [J]. 2014 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2014, : 1314 - 1319
  • [6] Incentive Mechanism of Crowdsensing Based on Loss Aversion
    Liu J.
    Gao M.
    [J]. Huanan Ligong Daxue Xuebao/Journal of South China University of Technology (Natural Science), 2019, 47 (08): : 96 - 104
  • [7] Bi-Objective Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing With Budget/Cost Constraint
    Zhou, Yuanhang
    Tong, Fei
    He, Shibo
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, 2024, 23 (01) : 223 - 237
  • [8] Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing under Budget Constraints
    Song, Zheng
    Ngai, Edith
    Ma, Jian
    Gong, Xiangyang
    Liu, Yazhi
    Wang, Wendong
    [J]. 2014 IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING CONFERENCE (WCNC), 2014, : 3361 - 3366
  • [9] A Location-Based Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing Systems with Budget Constraints
    Jaimes, Luis G.
    Vergara-Laurens, Idalides
    Labrador, Miguel A.
    [J]. 2012 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS (PERCOM), 2012, : 103 - 108
  • [10] Blockchain-Based Efficient Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsensing
    Jiang, Qiulu
    Wan, Wunan
    Qin, Zhi
    Zhang, Jinquan
    Han, Hui
    Zhang, Shibin
    Xia, Jinyue
    [J]. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, ICAIS 2022, PT III, 2022, 13340 : 120 - 132