Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy

被引：3
|
作者：
Ma, Ben-jiang [1 ]
Ye, Jing-yu [1 ]
Liu, Geng [2 ]
Huang, Yuan-ji [3 ]
机构：
[1] Cent South Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410083, Hunan, Peoples R China
[2] China Mobile Chengdu Ind Res Inst, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Univ Sci & Engn, Coll Tourism & Cultural Ind, Yongzhou, Hunan, Peoples R China
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2020年 / 41卷 / 07期
关键词：
PROBATIONARY PERIOD; EQUILIBRIUM; DEMAND; ECONOMICS; MARKETS; CHINA;
D O I：
10.1002/mde.3178
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In the case of incomplete environmental liability insurance, enterprises are likely to go bankrupt. Rational enterprises generally do not want to insure the environmental loss liability in case of bankruptcy even if they are compensated by insurance companies. This means that the premium calculated now is high, which may be the main reason for the current enterprises to cherish insurance. Based on this, a basic model of environmental liability insurance contract considering bankruptcy under ex ante asymmetric information is established. The model is improved by using the information screening combination tool, which further improves the efficiency of information screening.
引用
收藏
页码：1327 / 1337
页数：11
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