Legislative due process and simple interest group politics: Ensuring minimal deliberation through judicial review of congressional processes

Federal statutes are enacted that, in whole or in part, have failed to receive even minimal attention from Congress. Because the most obvious solution to this problem-procedural reform of Congress's internal legislative rides-has not been forthcoming, Victor Goldfeld attempts to put forth the strongest possible case for a judicial approach to addressing this problem. Drawing on recent Supreme Court decisions, Goldfeld outlines "legislative due process"-a form of judicial review in which courts would examine the legislative process by which federal statutory provisions are enacted to ensure that such provisions received at least a minimal level of congressional deliberation. This would improve the quality of congressional policymaking, and help minimize the ability of special interest groups to game the legislative process. He eschews coining to a firm conclusion on whether legislative due process is a viable model of judicial review, instead providing the reader with a framework for approaching that question. The Constitution does not and cannot guarantee that legislators will carefully scrutinize legislation and deliberate before acting. In a democracy it is the electorate that holds the legislators accountable for the wisdom of their choices.(1) I see no reason why the character of the [Congress's] procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.... [I]t seems to me that judicial review should include a consideration of the procedural character of the decision-making process.(2.)