Defensible territory for entity realism

被引:16
|
作者
Clarke, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Charles Sturt Univ, ARC Commonwealth Special Res Ctr Appl Philosophy, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia
来源
关键词
D O I
10.1093/bjps/52.4.701
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In the face of argument to the contrary, it is shown that there is defensible middle ground available for entity realism, between the extremes of scientific realism and empiricist antirealism. Cartwright's ([1983]) earlier argument for defensible middle ground between these extremes, which depended crucially on the viability of an underdeveloped distinction between inference to the best explanation (IBE) and inference to the most probable cause (IPC), is examined and its defects are identified. The relationship between IBE and IPC is clarified and a revised version of Cartwright's argument for defensible middle ground, which is free of the identified defects, is presented.
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页码:701 / 722
页数:22
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