Non-compete clauses, employee effort and spin-off entrepreneurship: A laboratory experiment

被引:9
|
作者
Buenstorf, Guido [1 ,2 ]
Engel, Christoph [3 ]
Fischer, Sven [4 ]
Gueth, Werner [3 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kassel, Dept Econ, Nora Platiel Str 5, D-34109 Kassel, Germany
[2] Univ Kassel, INCHER Kassel, Nora Platiel Str 5, D-34109 Kassel, Germany
[3] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[4] Newcastle Univ, Sch Business, 5 Barrack Rd, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 4SE, Tyne & Wear, England
[5] Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management, Frankfurt, Germany
[6] LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy
关键词
Non-compete clause; Effort; Spin-off entrepreneurship; Reciprocity Fairness; SILICON VALLEY; GIFT EXCHANGE; TECHNOLOGY; DISAGREEMENTS; AGREEMENTS; COVENANTS; MOBILITY; INDUSTRY;
D O I
10.1016/j.respol.2016.08.005
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on working effort and spin-off entrepreneurship. An employee invests effort in the probability of a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation the employee may want to start her own spin-off firm and compete with her prior employer. In the baseline setup without non-compete clause, spin-offs result from failed negotiation about employee compensation even though they reduce the joint payoffs of both parties. In two treatments with non-compete clause the employer can prevent successful innovators from leaving the firm. We find no significantly negative effect of non-compete clauses on employee effort, even if compensation is low. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2113 / 2124
页数:12
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