Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

被引：1
|
作者：
Romero-Medina, Antonio [1 ]
Triossi, Matteo [2 ]
机构：
[1] Carlos III Univ Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid, Spain
[2] Univ Chile, Ctr Appl Econ, Dept Ind Engn, Santiago, Chile
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2020年 / 16卷 / 03期
关键词：
multi-unit demand; stability; strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; ASSIGNMENT;
D O I：
10.1111/ijet.12214
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
引用
收藏
页码：349 / 354
页数：6
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