While Seoul and Washington have sought to preserve the aura of peace the Kumchang-ni agreement has brought, they must nonetheless give heed to the necessity for caution. Seoul must reassess the real threat posed by the August 1998 missile test and reconfirm what it must do should North Korea present another surprise. Washington must consider the disillusionment among Northeast Asia security watchers and others over the test. While these naysayers may have been impressed by the success of the Kumchang-ni negotiations, North Korea retains the potential to spark concerns again. There are several options that may be pursued as a way to prepare for such possibilities. First, the two allies must prepare response scenarios against any unexpected developments in the North. Such scenarios should include role divisions including engagement-engagement, confrontation-confrontation, or good guy-bad guy approaches. The key to dealing with unpredictable North Korea is versatility and flexibility, not adherence to a naive declared persistency in a particular line of policy. Second, South Korean security concerns regarding the next decade should be redressed. The ROK-U.S. alliance needs urgently to demonstrate more clearly its capability to reinforce the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in Korea rapidly in a crisis situation. Such preparations should be made independent of any potential scenario. Washington also can review the Defense Counter-proliferation Initiative efforts and expedite national missile defense deployment. Though a debate is going on about whether the latter would contradict the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the U.S. should proceed either within the framework of the treaty or revise it with Russian cooperation. The early deployment of such systems would not only improve U.S. security against missile threats from rogue states but also fill the credibility gap in the U.S. security commitment toward South Korea. Third, the U.S. needs to rethink the inter-Korean missile gap. To this end, American efforts can be bidirectional: reduce North Korea's missile capability and increase South Korea's deterrence capabilities. To accomplish the latter, the ROK-U.S. missile note should be scrapped or revised so that South Korea can develop its own long-range attack missiles.
