A conceptualist argument for a spiritual substantial soul

被引：6
|
作者：
Moreland, J. P. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Biola Univ, Talbot Sch Theol, La Mirada, CA 90369 USA
来源：
RELIGIOUS STUDIES | 2013年 / 49卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1017/S0034412512000133
中图分类号：
B9 [宗教];
学科分类号：
010107 ;
摘要：
I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism - minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies - based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking (i.e. conscious) matter is metaphysically possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit.
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页码：35 / 43
页数：9
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