Analysis of Cooperative Failure Between an Upstream Firm and a Downstream Firm Based on Coordinative Game

被引:0
|
作者
Tao Zhenyu [1 ]
Chen Xiuping [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
关键词
Coordinative Game; Prisoner's Dilemma; Promise; Cooperation Failure;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ;
摘要
Much failure of cooperation is described to prisoner's dilemma. Yet this paper believes that an upstream firm and a downstream firm in a logistics can transform prisoner's dilemma to coordination game through promise. Although coordination failure in coordination game can result in failure of alliance, strategy to coordination failure has its own advantage contrasting to prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, if game types among cooperative members change according to circumstance and time, then, unmatching between the resulting game types and strategies can also results alliance failure.
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页码:608 / 613
页数:6
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