Microfinance;
Repayment incentives;
Contagion;
BANK RUNS;
MICROFINANCE;
MARKETS;
GAMES;
DEBT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.005
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
NYU, Grad Creat Writing Program, New York, NY 10003 USA
Acad Amer Poets, New York, NY 10038 USA
Amer Acad Arts & Sci, Cambridge, MA 02138 USANYU, Grad Creat Writing Program, New York, NY 10003 USA