Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample

被引:15
|
作者
Ahmed, Aril [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
来源
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW | 2013年 / 122卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1215/00318108-1963725
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it. © 2013 by Cornell University.
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页码:289 / 306
页数:18
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