Stackelberg Game Based Energy and Reserve Management for a Fast Electric Vehicle Charging Station

The problem of energy and reserve exchange between electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is studied using a Stackelberg game. In this game, the FCS operator, who acts as a leader, needs to set its energy and reserve prices to optimize its revenue while ensuring EV users' charging demand. On the other hand, EV users, who act as the followers, needs to decide their charging and reserve strategies to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and reserves provision. It is shown that the proposed game possesses a social optimal Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the FCS operator optimizes its prices and the EV users choose their equilibrium strategies. A mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) reformulation of the game is proposed and can be solved efficiently by commercial software packages. The reformulation enables the FCS operator and EV users to reach the equilibrium and is assessed by extensive simulations.