Zero-sum games for continuous-time Markov jump processes with risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion

被引:12
|
作者
Wei, Qingda [1 ]
机构
[1] Huaqiao Univ, Sch Econ & Finance, Quanzhou 362021, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Zero-sum game; Risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion; Saddle-point equilibrium; STOCHASTIC GAMES; CHAINS;
D O I
10.1016/j.orl.2017.11.008
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In this paper we study the zero-sum games for continuous-time Markov jump processes under the risk sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion. The state space is a Borel space and the transition rates are allowed to be unbounded. Under the suitable conditions, we use a new value iteration approach to establish the existence of a solution to the risk-sensitive finite-horizon optimality equations of the players, obtain the existence of the value of the game and show the existence of saddle-point equilibria. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 75
页数:7
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