The Degree of Judicial Enforcement and Credit Markets: Evidence from Japanese Household Panel Data

被引:0
|
作者
Horioka, Charles Yuji [1 ]
Sekita, Shizuka [2 ]
机构
[1] Osaka Univ, Inst Social & Econ Res, Ibaraki, Osaka 5670047, Japan
[2] Kyoto Sangyo Univ, Dept Econ, Kyoto 603, Japan
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-2443.2010.01123.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The length of trials in Japan has become shorter over time. Theory predicts that better judicial enforcement (i.e., faster court proceedings) will decrease the probability of being credit rationed, increase loan size, and increase the probability of bankruptcy. Our estimation results based on micro data from a panel survey of consumers in conjunction with judicial data by court district show that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being rationed in some cases and decreases loan size (contrary to expectation) but increases the probability of bankruptcy (as expected). Thus, better judicial enforcement facilitates the recovery of loans but may be socially harmful.
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页码:245 / 268
页数:24
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