The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy

被引:37
|
作者
Galbiati, Roberto [2 ]
Zanella, Giulio [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
[2] CNRS EconomiX & Sci Po, Paris, France
关键词
Social interactions; Neighborhood effects; Social multiplier; Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Excess variance; AUDIT; IDENTIFICATION; ENFORCEMENT; CRIME;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We estimate social externalities of tax evasion in a model where congestion of the auditing resources of local tax authorities generates a social multiplier. Identification is based on a contrast of the variance of tax evasion at different levels of aggregation. We use a unique data set that contains audits of about 80,000 small businesses and professionals in Italy and also provides an exact measure of reference groups in our model. We find a social multiplier of about 3, which means that the equilibrium response to a shock that induces an exogenous variation in mean concealed income is about 3 times the initial average response. This is a short-run effect that persists to the extent that auditing resources are not adjusted to internalize the congestion externality. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:485 / 494
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] TAX RATES AND TAX EVASION - EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA AMNESTY DATA
    CRANE, SE
    NOURZAD, F
    [J]. NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, 1990, 43 (02) : 189 - 199
  • [2] Tax rates and tax evasion: Evidence from "missing imports" in China
    Fisman, R
    Wei, SJ
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2004, 112 (02) : 471 - 496
  • [3] Tax evasion and social interactions
    Fortin, Bernard
    Lacroix, Guy
    Villeval, Marie-Claire
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2007, 91 (11-12) : 2089 - 2112
  • [4] Tax evasion on a social network
    Degl'Innocenti, Duccio Gamannossi
    Rablen, Matthew D.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2020, 169 : 79 - 91
  • [5] Tax evasion - a social norm?
    Zvonovsski, VB
    Pyshkova, NV
    [J]. SOTSIOLOGICHESKIE ISSLEDOVANIYA, 2003, (04): : 51 - 57
  • [6] Import tax evasion and avoidance: Evidence from Iran
    Yousefi, Kowsar
    Vesal, Mohammad
    Pilvar, Hanifa
    [J]. QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2020, 75 : 31 - 39
  • [7] GOVERNMENT SIZE AND TAX EVASION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
    Li, Lixing
    Ma, Guangrong
    [J]. PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2015, 20 (02) : 346 - 364
  • [8] Corporate tax evasion: Evidence from international trade
    Bussy, Adrien
    [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2023, 159
  • [9] External audit and tax evasion: evidence from India
    Shehata, Nermeen
    Nathan, Siva
    Farooq, Omar
    Dahawy, Khaled
    [J]. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2023, 55 (34) : 4023 - 4036
  • [10] Distributional Implications of Tax Evasion: Evidence from the Lab
    Doerrenberg, Philipp
    Duncan, Denvil
    [J]. PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW, 2014, 42 (06) : 720 - 744