Conflict, consensus, and liberty in J. S. Mill's representative democracy

The relationship between representative democracy and conflict in John Stuart Mill's political philosophy has been interpreted in very different ways. While some scholars claim that Millian democracy is incompatible with political conflict, others identify in Mill a radical political agonism that would offer a non-consensual model of deliberative democracy. This paper argues that neither of these views is exactly accurate: although he highlights the centrality of conflict in political life, Mill believes that democratic deliberation presupposes a minimal level of consensus regarding the formal value of democracy's basic principles, viz. the principles of individual freedom and equality. Initially, I shall reconstruct the relationship between conflict and consensus in Mill's conception of representative democracy. I shall then investigate his association of representation and advocacy and show that Mill's encomium on political conflict was influenced by Guizot's work. Finally, I shall explain how a democratic debate riven with conflict is conducive to individual freedom.