Pricing policies for a dual-channel green supply chain under demand disruptions

Nowadays, considering the growing tendency of companies toward e-commerce as well as green production, disruption management in such chains requires more consideration from the academic societies. This paper, for the first time, investigates the demand disruption management in a dual-channel supply chain producing and selling green products. We examine the pricing and greening issues for a dual-channel green supply chain when the market demand is disrupted. The investigated supply chain is composed of one manufacturer being responsible for producing green products, and one retailer. We solve this problem in centralized and decentralized cases under consistent pricing policy and compare the results of the two cases. In the decentralized scenario, a Stackelberg game approach is proposed in order to model the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we investigate the value of knowing of demand disruptions. We obtain that when a demand disruption occurs, the original production quantity which is determined based on the predicted demand will have some robustness in both centralized and decentralized dual-channel green supply chains. We also provide some numerical analyses. The results reveal that increased market scale caused by a disruption, lower greening cost and lower level of customers' loyalty to the retail channel are not only beneficial for the supply chain, but also bring more enhancements to the greening level of green products. Moreover, the centralized scenario under demand disruptions leads to achieve the products with a higher green degree compared to the decentralized scenario. In addition, results reveal that when the disruption increases the market scale, or when the greening cost decreases, the optimal prices will be increased in both decision-making structures.