Collusion without communication

被引：6
|
作者：
Muren, A [1 ]
Pyddoke, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Stockholm Univ, Dept Econ, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
来源：
INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2006年 / 18卷 / 01期
关键词：
tacit collusion; coordination; laboratory experiment;
D O I：
10.1016/j.infoecopol.2005.10.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study tacit collusion by investigating experimentally the effect of explicit instructions on how to coordinate prices. We find: (i) no tacit collusion in triopoly markets even with explicit instructions on how to coordinate, and (ii) increased tacit collusion with explicit instructions in duopoly markets. The results suggest that there are additional factors than the difficulty of finding a collusive pricing scheme, that effectively limit tacit collusion. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：43 / 54
页数：12
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